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1: Introduction
The interest in the recent appointment of Ben Bernanke as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve is a further indication of the primacy of monetary policy as a main tool used by US policy makers in the stabilization of inflation and output. The importance of monetary policy changes and the transmission of information contained therein to asset markets has been a subject of interest in a number of papers in recent years. This paper examines the impact of changes in the main monetary policy instrument in the United States, the Federal Funds Rate, on Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). The rationale behind the examination of REITs is due to their unique structure in comparison to mainstream equities. In particular, the requirement that at least 75% of their assets be invested in real estate and the minimum 90% payout of their taxable earnings as dividends may lead to a different response in REIT prices in comparison with equities to changes in monetary policy 1 .
The impact of policy rate changes on the general equity market can be viewed as occurring through three channels. Firstly, the impact on the expected level of future dividends of the firms, secondly, any associated change in the real interest rate used to discount these dividends and thirdly changes in the equity risk premium. Given the characteristics of not only REITs but also the underlying private real estate market, a number of aspects of these linkages may take on additional importance in the context of the traded real estate sector. With respect to dividends, the 90% dividend payout requirement will lead to more substantial income flows from REITs than common stocks.
Monetary policy changes will have an influence on general economic activity that feeds through to occupational demand in the underlying real estate market. This will impact upon rents obtainable by the REIT from the underlying property portfolio and hence will directly affect the dividend payments of the firm. In addition, rate changes will also influence the value of the underlying portfolio. Not only will changes in rental income impact on property values but furthermore, given the linkages between the space and capital markets (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1992 and Fisher, 1992) , there is an impact through cap rates on the value of the underlying portfolio. These effects mean that REITs are far more heavily tied to their underlying asset base than both equities generally and other forms of real estate securities, such as corporate based vehicles in markets such as the UK and Hong Kong. It also means that the response of REITs to changes in monetary policy may differ from the general evidence regarding the stock market.
A further factor that may also lead to differences in the results for REITs in comparison to the overall equity market is the relative size and maturity of the sector. Our methodological approach draws on the recent work of Bomfim (2003) , Jones et al. (1998) and Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) 
Anticipated versus Unanticipated Changes
Given that the current paper analyses the impact of official rate changes and decisions of the FOMC, the analysis here links in with the broader literature that has examined the impact of macroeconomic variables on equity markets. Flannery & Protopapadkis (2002) Both Smirlock & Yawitz (1985) and Pearce & Roley (1985) provide evidence on the impact of rate changes on the stock market. Pearce & Roley (1985) is one of the first studies to split the rate change into its expected and unexpected component, through the use of survey data. Post 1979 and the change in rate change policy the authors show that stock prices react significantly to unanticipated changes in the discount rate. increases ex-post returns, an interesting element of the analysis is that asymmetries in the responses may also help to explain the findings of Fama & French (1995) . The authors find that monetary shocks affect smaller firms to a greater extent than large firms. It is hypothesized that this is due to the impact on credit availability noted by Gertler & Gilchrist (1994) . Given the relative size of REITs it may therefore be expected that this would lead to an enhanced sensitivity in comparison to the overall market. However, it should be remembered that the tax status of REITs also brings into question the tax advantages of debt issuance.
Kuttner (2001) Furthermore, Rigobon & Sack (2003) find that the relationship between interest rates and stock prices is a bilateral one, reporting evidence that stock market behavior influences future interest rate movements. A recent paper by Bernanke & Kuttner (2005) adopts both an event study methodology and a VAR model of the type proposed by Campbell (1991) . The event study results show a significant response to unanticipated changes in the rate. The VAR analysis finds that the primary impact of rate changes onto prices is through their impact on expected future excess returns 8 .
Behavioral Effects around Event Days
The likely behavioral changes in the volatility of asset returns around particular event windows and tests of the calm before the storm effect have has been investigated by Jones et al. (1998 (2003) also finds evidence that the effect of the shock on volatility is asymmetric.
3: Data and Methodological Framework
Our methodology draws on the recent work of Bomfim (2003) , Jones et al. (1998) and Anderson and Bollerslev (1998) . Firstly, we examine the impact of FOMC announcements on both the returns and volatility of the REIT sector. Specifically, by splitting the rate change into its anticipated and unanticipated components the analysis allows an examination of the impact of unexpected rate changes. Secondly, the behaviour of REIT returns around the time of FOMC meetings is considered and we investigate the calm before the storm effect.
The data is this paper is daily and extends from 31 st January 1996 through to March (2000), Reinhart & Simin (1997) , Roley & Sellon (1998) and Thornton (1998) . Previous empirical work in the field such as
Connolly & Wang (2003), Flannery & Protopapadkis (2002) and Li & Engle (1998) use alternative measures of expectations. These alternatives include the growth rate of money supply and survey data, however, Gurkaynak et al. (2002) show that the fed funds futures contract provides the best available forecast of the Feds Fund Rate 10 .
The modeling approach adopted here is based on that used by Bomfim (2003) and Jones et al. (1998) . The GARCH model can be specified as follows: The model is estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood procedure proposed by Bollerslev & Wooldridge (1992) .
As previously mentioned, three key hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis relates to a news effect and whether an unanticipated change in the fed funds rate has any effect on the REIT sector. This is examined through the conditional mean equation.
The hypothesis would be supported if β 1 is negative and statistically significant. We also address whether the shock to monetary policy has any effect on the second moments, which would be highlighted by the statistical significance of φ in Equation (6). The possibility that there may be an asymmetric volatility effect (that higher than expected changes in rates will lead to great volatility) will also be considered. The final hypothesis relates to the calm before the storm effect. This refers to a hypothesized lower level of volatility on the day before FOMC meetings and higher on the day of the announcement itself. This is tested based the results from Equation (6). The hypothesis is confirmed if coefficient δ 0 is positive and significant and δ 1 is negative and significant at conventional levels.
4: Empirical Results
The model is estimated under a variety of different scenarios. The initial examination concentrates upon changes in the Fed Fund Futures on FOMC meeting days. We then extend this to also incorporate unscheduled rate changes that take place outside of scheduled FOMC meetings 11 . The initial analysis is reported in Table 1 . From these results it can be seen that the change in Fed Funds Futures impacts significantly on both the mean and volatility of the Equity REIT sector. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients in relation to the mean and volatility equations have the anticipated sign, i.e., negative and positive respectively. This alone is interesting given the frequent lack of consistent findings in previous studies of REIT sensitivity to interest rate movements. The Devaney (2001) paper adopts the most similar methodological approach, in that a GARCH based model, in this case a GARCH-in-Mean specification, is used. However, the analysis on market rates generally finds an insignificant response in either the mean or variance equations. Only when the Mortgage REIT sector is examined are significant coefficients reported. This divergence in findings highlights the importance of taking into account market expectations and incorporating into the model specification the unanticipated nature of the rate change. In addition, it should also be reiterated that the Devaney (2001) paper examined monthly not daily data.
As would also be expected, the coefficients relating to the lagged REIT sector and the market index, as proxied by the S&P 500, are positive and significant at conventional levels. There is also evidence of GARCH effects in the model, justifying the use of this form of specification. One issue relating to the day of the week dummies that deserves mention is that in both the mean and variance equations the coefficients referring to Friday are positively signed and significant at conventional levels. This indicates a Friday effect in both the first and second moments of daily REIT index data.
The second issue relates to the hypothesized calm before the storm. As noted, this is tested through an examination of coefficients δ 0 and δ 1 in the variance equation.
Unlike previous empirical evidence such as Bomfim (2003) we find no evidence of such an effect. For the hypothesis to be supported, δ 0 should be positive and significant and δ 1 negative and significant. The results show that neither coefficient is statistically significant. Hence, our results indicate that while there is a reaction in terms of both REIT's returns and their volatility to new information, we find no behavioral change around the time scheduled interest rate changes.
The behavioral insignificance may occur for a number of reasons including issues related to REIT's returns or the use of scheduled interest rate changes. It is possible that non-synchronous and thin trading leads to the behavioral insignificance in the Wilshire REIT index thereby contributing to these findings. As noted previously, despite the increase in both the size of the REIT sector and the corresponding increase in trading volume in recent years, the sector is relatively small. While the average market cap in the sector was just under $2bn as of the end of 2005, 46% of the firms had a market value less than $1bn. The use of individual REIT returns and the separate examination of REITs of differing levels of both market value and trading volume may produce more conclusive findings in this regard. In comparison to the findings of Bomfim (2003) in relation to the S&P 500, it should be emphasized that his initial lack of significant evidence was in relation to the sample pre-dating the change in Fed policy in 1994. Once this was accounted for in the analysis significant results were reported. As our sample dates only from 1996 the change in Fed policy cannot be a possible reason behind the lack of significant evidence.
In order to further examine possible causes behind the differences in these findings we re-estimate the model under two alternative scenarios. The first is to use a portfolio of large cap heavily traded REITs to check for possible non-synchronous trading effects.
The portfolio is created using the largest percentile of Equity REITs in each year during our sample. As with the Dow Jones-Wilshire index the portfolio is valueweighted. The second scenario is to re-estimate the tests using the S&P 500 to check for consistency in the Bomfim (2003) results and to exactly match the sample period.
The results for both the large-cap REIT portfolio and the S&P are contained in Table   2 . The results are interesting in a number of respects. Firstly, with regard to the large cap REIT portfolio, there is no discernable difference in the results, indicating that the previously reported findings for the overall sector index were not unduly influenced by non-synchronous trading effects. In general there are no substantial changes in the coefficients reported with significant impacts on REIT volatility recorded, the significance of coefficients relating to the lagged REIT and S&P returns in the mean equation and the lack of significance in relation to the calm before the storm. One difference is that changes in the fed funds futures rate does not significantly impact upon REIT returns 12 .
This view is to some extent also supported in with respect to the results for the S&P 500. These findings, using a matching sample period, differ substantially from those contained in the Bomfim (2003) paper and suggest that his findings are sensitive to the exact sample used. As previously noted, Bomfim (2003) argues that the significant results obtained followed the change in Federal Reserve operating procedure in 1994, using a sample of data that ends in December 1998. The change in the fed funds futures does not impact significantly on either returns or volatility in the S&P 13 .
Furthermore, there is no evidence of a significant calm before the storm effect in this sample period. The lack of significance in the mean equation and the similar finding in relation to large cap REITs would suggest that the findings in the initial analysis are indeed driven by the enhanced exposure of smaller REITs with regard to changes in the fed funds rate.
In relation to the variance equation, the fact that both REIT series' reported significant responses in volatility whereas the S&P did not would suggest that it is more of a REIT specific issue rather than merely one of firm size. As noted in the introduction there is a strong intuitive argument as to why Real Estate Investment Trusts may display a higher degree of sensitivity to interest rate movements in comparison to the general stock market. This comes from the multiple impacts of rate changes with regard to issues such as the effect on cap rates and the potential impact on underlying occupational demand in the property market.
The analysis contained in Table 1 is solely concerned with rate changes announced at scheduled meetings of the FOMC. In order to consider the sensitivity of our results we investigate the impact of rate changes on all announcement days, both scheduled and unscheduled. While the number of unscheduled announcements has fallen dramatically in recent years it is still an important issue to consider. This is particularly the case for the events of 2001. During the first half of 2001 there were two unscheduled rate changes (interest rate reductions), 3 rd January and 18 th April.
These two particular unscheduled rate changes are noteworthy given the Fed's preference for scheduled rate changes in recent years and the fact that they were both 50 basis point reductions. In addition, the impact of 9/11 was also a major factor on the markets interest rate expectations and the actions of the Federal Reserve. For this reason, we extend the analysis, as reported in Table 3 , to include rate changes that occurred outside of the auspices of a scheduled FOMC meeting 14 .
There are relatively few changes in the results after this extension of the analysis. As with the original specification, GARCH effects are evident, there is the anticipated influence of both lagged REIT returns and the contemporaneous S&P 500 in the mean equation and evidence of a Friday effect on both returns and volatility. In addition, as with the results previously discussed there is no significant evidence of a calm before the storm effect. Finally, there is evidence that there is a significant response to the unanticipated component of the rate change in terms of both the mean and variance equation. As with the initial analysis we also re-run the analysis using the large-cap REIT portfolio and the S&P 500. The patterns in the findings are broadly similar to those in the initial tests with a lack of significance in the mean equation for the large cap REIT portfolio. One difference is however observed in relation to the S&P in that while volatility does not significantly fall the day preceding an interest rate announcement it does rise to a significant extent on the day of the announcement. This makes intuitive sense in that the sole difference in this analysis is that it incorporates unscheduled announcements and therefore any rate changes will not have been anticipated to the same extent as with those made at FOMC meetings 15 .
Given the consistent statistically significant effect of the shock on both the mean and the variance, in the final part of the analysis we investigate whether this effect is asymmetric. This analysis is based on the leverage effect noted by Black (1976) and the volatility feedback hypothesis of French et al. (1989) . This has been supported empirically in papers such as French et al. (1989) and Nelson (1991) while asymmetry has also been reported in papers closely related to the current study such as Bomfim (2003) and Connolly & Wang (1998) . To examine this issue the variance equation is adjusted to take the following form. where positive and negative unexpected changes in the fed funds futures rate are separated.
16 17 The results, contained in Table 4 , show no evidence of any asymmetry with respect to the shock on REIT's volatility. The existing evidence on mainstream equity returns has largely found evidence of an asymmetrical response, with an enhanced rise in volatility following a negative shock, i.e. a higher than anticipated rise in rates, in comparison to positive shocks. However, in the case of REITs both coefficients are of the same sign and are not statistically different, with a p-value from the Wald statistic of 0.23. The results for the large-cap REIT portfolio and the S&P 500 also fail to report significant findings 18 . Given the lack of significant findings in relation to either large-cap REIT portfolio or the S&P 500, it is impossible to state whether the overall REIT results are due to non-synchronous or thin trading issues or to a REIT specific issue. However, they do however indicate that previous general empirical evidence on asymmetry is perhaps sensitive to the sample period used.
5: Conclusions
This study offers a number of important contributions in the analysis of the sensitivity of REITs to changes in interest rates. Firstly, it has, through the use of the fed funds futures, indicated the effect of unanticipated changes in interest rates on both REIT's returns and their volatility. Although there is an established literature addressing the influence of interest rate changes on REITS returns, this is the first paper to explicitly take account of the impact of unanticipated changes. Secondly, it has specifically tested for both asymmetric responses in volatility to interest rate movements and the calm before the storm effect. The analysis provides a number of interesting results, relative to previous studies on REIT's returns and volatility, but also relative to mainstream equities.
In comparison to previous studies of REIT interest rate sensitivity the main results do show significant responses in both returns and volatility to unanticipated rate changes.
The importance of the specification of unanticipated changes in interest rates is critical in considering the previous results where interest rate changes were adopted.
Although the effect of the shock is significant on both returns and volatility, there is no evidence of asymmetry. There is also no evidence of changing volatility behavior coincident to Federal Reserve announcements, calm before the storm. While the lack of any behavioral effect may appear inconsistent with the previous results reported for equities we also report results for both large cap REIT's and equities that are consistent with an absence of a significant calm before the storm effect, which would indicate that previously reported results are sensitive to the exact sample analyzed. 0.01 0.23 φ 0.57* 2.01 Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge (1992) . * indicates statistical significance at conventional levels Using one day change in 1 month ahead federal funds future contract as unanticipated change. The t statistics are robust using the procedure from Bollerslev & Wooldridge (1992) . * indicates statistical significance at conventional levels
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